State of Utah, Plaintiff/Appellee, v. Nathan Sexton, Defendant/Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School 
BYU Law Digital Commons 
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs (2007– ) 
2016 
State of Utah, Plaintiff/Appellee, v. Nathan Sexton, Defendant/
Appellant 
Utah Court of Appeals 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law 
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah. 
Recommended Citation 
Brief of Appellee, State of Utah vs. Sexton, No. 20151069 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2016). 
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/3296 
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals Briefs (2007– ) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital 
Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/
utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with 
questions or feedback. 
IN THE UT AH GOUR T OF APPEALS 





Case Number: 20151069-CA 
BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT 
Appeal from a conviction for possession of a controlled substance, a 
class B misdemeanor and possession of drug paraphernalia, a class B 
misdemeanor in the Second District Court, State of Utah, the 
Honorable Joseph Bean, Judge, presiding. 
Christopher F. Allred (7801) 
WEBER COUNTY ATTORNEY 
2380 Washington Blvd, Suite 230 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Attorney for Appell,ee 
Samuel P. Newton (9935) 
LAW OFFICE OF 
SAMUELP.NEWTON,PC 
The Historic KM Building 
40 2nd Street East, Suite 235 
Kalispell, MT 59901-6114 
PLED Attorney for Appellant 
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
MAR 1 8 2016 
:-::\_ lllJI 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 





Case Number: 20151069-CA 
BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT 
Appeal from a conviction for possession of a controlled substance, a 
class B misdemeanor and possession of drug paraphernalia, a class B 
misdemeanor in the Second District Court, State of Utah, the 
Honorable Joseph Bean, Judge, presiding. 
Christopher F. Allred (7801) 
WEBER COUNTY ATTORNEY 
2380 Washington Blvd, Suite 230 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Attorney far Appellee 
Samuel P. Newton (9935) 
LAW OFFICE OF 
SAMUELP.NEWTON,PC 
The Historic KM Building 
40 2nd Street East, Suite 235 
Kalispell, MT 59901-6114 








TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF CONTENTS III 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES IV 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND JURISDICTION 1 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES & STANDARD OF REVIEW 1 
CONSTITUTIONAL OR STATUTORY PROVISIONS 2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 2 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 2 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 5 
ARGUMENT 5 
POINTI 5 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN IMPOSING A 
CONSECUTIVEJAIL SENTENCE ON TOP OF THE PRISON TIME 
MR. SEXTON WAS ALREADY SERVING, GIVEN THE OFFENSE'S 
LACK OF SERIOUSNESS AND MR. SEXTON'S REHABILITATIVE 
NEEDS 5 
A. THE GRAVITY AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE OFFENSE WERE FAIRLY 
MINOR AND THERE WERE NO KNOWN VICTIMS . 10 
B. WHILE MR. SEXTON HAD A HISTORY OF NON-COMPLIANCE WITH 
PROBATION, THIS WAS DUE TO HIS STRUGGLES WITH DRUG ADDICTION, 
WHICH THE COURT ACKNOWLEDGED, BUT IT ERRED IN OVERLY PUNISHING 
HIM FOR THE OFFENSE. ________________ 12 
CONCLUSION _________________ 17 
RULE 24 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE 18 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 19 
ADDENDUM A (CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS) 
ADDENDUM B (STATUTORY PROVISIONS) 
ADDENDUM C (SENTENCING TRANSCRIPT) 
111 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES 
State v. Arghittu, 2015 UT App 22, 343 P.3d 709 10 
State v. Galli, 967 P.2d 930 (Utah 1998) 6, 7, 8 
State v. Gibbons, 779 P.2d 1133 (Utah 1989) 6 
State v. Helms, 2002 UT 12, 40 P.3d 626 2, 6, 7, 9 
State v. McCovfJJ, 803 P.2d 1234 (Utah 1990) 1 
State v. McCovfJJ, 803 P.2d 1234 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) 2 
State v. Perez, 2002 UT App 211, 52 P.3d 451 6,8,9 
State v. Schweitzer, 943 P.2d 649 (Utah 1997) 6 
State v. Smith, 909 P.2d 236 (Utah 1995) 7 
State v. Strunk, 846 P.2d 1297 (Utah 1993) 8 
State v. Valdez, 2008 UT App 329, 194 P.3d 195 9 
State v. Wright, 893 P.2d 1113 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) 1 
STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann.§ 58-37-2 ________________ 10 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401 6, 7 
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-l 03(2)(e) 1 
TREATISES 
ARNOLD M. WASHTON &JOANE. ZWEBEN, COCAINE & METHAMPHETAMINE 
ADDICTION: TREATMENT, RECOVERY, AND RELAPSE PREVENTION (W. W. 
Norton & Company) (2009) ________________ 13 
Claudio Erratico et al., In vitro and in vivo human metabolism of the synthetic cannabinoid 
AB-CHMI.NACA, 7 Drug Testing and Analysis (2015) _______ 10 
GRIFFITH EDWARDS & MALCOLM HAROLD LADER, ADDICTION: PROCESSES OF 
CHANGE (Oxford University Press) (1994) ___________ 13 
JONATHAN P. CAULKINS ET AL., DRUG POLICY: WHAT EVERYONE NEEDS TO 
KNOW (Oxford University Press) (2015) ____________ 15 
Marisol S. Castaneto et al., Synthetic cannabinoids: Epidemiology, pharmacodynamics, and 
clinical implications, 144 DRUG AND ALCOHOL DEPEI\TDENCE 12-41 (2014)_ l l 
Max Spadema et al., Spicing thing up: Synthetic cannabinoids, 228 






McLellan A et al., Drug dependence) a chronic medical illness: Implications for treatmen~ 
insurance) and outcomes evaluation, 284 JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN MEDICAL 
ASSOCIATION 1689-1695 (2000) _____________ 16 
Nora Volkow & Ting-Kai Li, 1he neuroscience of addiction, 8 NATURE 
NEUROSCIENCE (2005) _________________ 16 
ROBERT R. PERKINSON, CHEMICAL DEPENDENCY COUNSELING: A PRACTICAL 
GUIDE (SAGE) (2011) _______________ 13 
STEPHANIE L. BROOKE, THE USE OF THE CREATIVE THERAPIES WITH 
CHEMICAL DEPENDENCY ISSUES (Charles C Thomas Publisher) (2009) __ 13 
STEVEN BELENKO & CASSIA SPOHN, DRUGS, CRIME, AND JUSTICE (SAGE 
Publications) (2014) _________________ 15, 17 
THE REIATIONSHIP BETWEEN MENTAL HEALTH AND SUBSTANCE ABUSE AMONG 
ADOLESCENTS (Dept. of Health and Human Services, Substance Abuse and 
Mental Health Services Administration) (1999) __________ 13 
William A. Hunt et al., Relapse rates in addiction programs, 27 JOURNAL OF CLINICAL 
PSYCHOLOGY (1971) _________________ 13 
V 
. _d 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/ Appellee, 
v. Case Number: 20151069-CA 
NATHAN SEXTON 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND JURISDICTION 
Appeal from a conviction for possession of a controlled substance, a class B 
misdemeanor and possession of drug paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor in the 
Second District Court, State of Utah, the Honorable, Joseph Bean, Judge, 
presiding. 
This court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann.§ 78A-4-103(2)(e). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES & STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the trial court erroneously imposed consecutive sentences and 
refused to give credit for time served. 
a. Standard of Review: This court reviews a decision to impose 
consecutive sentences for an abuse of discretion. State v. Wright 893 
P.2d 1113, 1120 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). "An abuse of discretion 
results when the judge 'fails to consider all legally relevant 
[sentencing] factors,"' (State v. McCov/lJ', 803 P.2d 1234, 1235 (Utah 
1 
1990) ( citation omitted)), or when the trial judge fails to give 
'adequate weight to certain mitigating circumstances."' State v. Helms, 
2002 UT 12, 115, 40 P.3d 626 (citation omitted). 
a. Preservation of the Argument: Mr. Sexton asked the court to impose 
concurrent sentences. R. 52:7-8, 10. He also asked the court to give 
him credit for the time he had served. R. 52:11-12. 
CONSTITUTIONAL OR STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The texts of the relevant Constitutional provisions and statutes are m 
Addendum A and B. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On September 25, 2015 the State charged Mr. Sexton with a class A 
misdemeanor possession of a controlled substance inside a correctional facility and 
a class B misdemeanor possession of drug paraphernalia. R. 1-2. On October 22, 
2015, the parties negotiated a settlement where Mr. Sexton pied to an amended 
count 1 as a class B misdemeanor and count 2 as charged. R. 24-25; 52. The court 
imposed sentence that same date. Id. The judgment was filed on October 29, 
2015. R. 26-27. On November 20, 2015, Mr. Sexton filed a pro-se notice of 
appeal to this court. R. 2 9. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The State charged Mr. Sexton with possessing a bag of spice, and a lighter 
and some papers while he was in a correctional treatment facility, NUCCC. R. 
2 
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52:5. At the time, he was on parole which led to a violation of his parole and a 
return to prison. R. 52:7-8. At the change of plea hearing, held October 22, 2015, 
Mr. Sexton pled to two amended class B misdemeanors. R. 52:3-7. The court told 
Mr. Sexton that it "is possible that the Court could impose a consecutive sentence. 
I normally don't do that. I normally go concurrent, but you need to understand 
that it is a possibility." R. 52:6-7. 
Mr. Sexton asked the court to impose concurrent sentences given that this 
conduct violated his parole and returned him to the prison. R. 52:7-8. "[I]t's really 
all the same offense," counsel pointed out. R. 52:8. The State disagreed, noting 
that "[t]he presumption under the statute for an offense committed while on 
parole is that they run consecutively." R. 52:8, 9. Mr. Sexton pointed out that he 
was actually on probation at the time: 
I was actually on a charge -- they didn't send me to prison. They put 
me on probation to go to NUCCC and then I violated more than 
once. And then that's why they decided to drop my probation,. and 
that's what sent me to prison. I hadn't been to prison yet by that 
time. 
R. 52:9. The State asked the court to "send a message that we're going to run 
those consecutive when somebody possesses a controlled substance while in 
NUCCC." R. 52:9. An agent indicated that Mr. Sexton had four attempts to 
complete programming at NUCCC. R. 52:10-11. Mr. Sexton asked the court to 
run it concurrently so that he could do his time in prison and then "get out and get 
a job and progress my life." R. 52: 10. 
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The court responded that it could "authorize (the sentence] to be served at 
the prison" rather than at the jail. R. 52: 10. It imposed 180 days on each count to 
be seived concurrently with each other but consecutively to his prison sentence. R. 
52: 11. The court allowed the sentence to be seived at the prison, but refused to 
give Mr. Sexton credit for the four months he had already served for the crime. R. 
52:11-12. The court indicated that Mr. Sexton had had "a lot of opportunities 
given to you," but understood that "addiction is tough," and was "a very difficult 
thing." R. 52: 12. The court continued, 
You got to make some wise choices when you're out on the street. 
Most people when they are standing where you're standing, they 
really are determined to stay clean, and I'm sure you're feeling the 
same. And it's tough when people have it all around you. You've got 
to figure out some tools to be able to resist that and make better 
choices. 
I think everybody wants to see you be successful, but you're the one 
that's got to make those choices when the chips are done, when it's 
tough. I've given you kind of a middle-of-the-road sentence instead 
of going as harsh as the State wants. I haven't gone quite that harsh, 
but I haven't been as lenient either as [ defense counsel] or you would 
like me to be, but it is to send you a message that we've got to try and 
clean it up. It's got to start somewhere. And I'm not saying it's 
starting with you, but you're one of those that we're going to get 
relatively tough on if you're taking that into NU CCC. 
R. 52: 12-13. 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court erroneously sentenced Mr. Sexton to a consecutive sentence 
without considering three major facts: first, the offense he committed was relatively 
minor: the possession of a substance which is not even listed as a controlled 
substance in Utah and it had no victims. Second, he had already received an 
extensive punishment. Third, Mr. Sexton had strong rehabilitative needs. He 
exhibited all the problems with the disease of chronic drug dependency, and the 
court rather simplistically asserted that he had the choice to not relapse and to not 
reoff end. These three errors amounted to an abuse of discretion. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
The trial court abused its discretion in hnposing a 
consecutive jail sentence on top of the prison tune Mr. 
Sexton was already serving, given the offense's lack of 
seriousness and Mr. Sexton's rehabilitative needs 
The trial court failed to fully appreciate three facts: 1) that Mr. Sexton's 
offense was relatively minor; 2) that he had already been punished extensively and 
3) that the realities of drug addiction, which the court acknowledged, would 
account for multiple relapses. Therefore, the court failed to consider the statutory 
factors of gravity and circumstances of the offense, the lack of victim, and Mr. 
Sexton's rehabilitative needs. Additionally, although the statute presumes the 
imposition of a consecutive sentence, the court erred in failing to find a consecutive 
sentence inappropriate in Mr. Sexton's situation. 
5 
A trial court's "[a]buse of discretion 'may be manifest if the actions of the 
judge in sentencing were "inherently unfair" or if the judge imposed a "clearly 
excessive sentence.""' State v. Schweitzer, 943 P.2d 649, 651 (Utah 1997) (citation 
omitted). A trial court abuses its discretion when it "'fails to consider all legally 
relevant [sentencing] factors,"' McCovey, 803 P.2d at 1235 (quoting State v. Gibbons, 
779 P.2d 1133, 1135 (Utah 1989) (footnote omitted)), or when the trial judge fails 
to give adequate weight to certain mitigating circumstances."' Helms, 2002 UT 12 
at 1 15 (quoting State v. Galli, 967 P.2d 930, 938 (Utah 1998)) This court will find a 
trial court has abused its discretion when it concludes that "no reasonable [person] 
would take the view adopted by the trial court." Schweitzer, 943 P.2d at 651 
( quotation omitted). 
Trial courts are required to consider statutory factors and address 
recommendations in the presentence report before imposing a sentence for more 
than one felony offense. See State v. Perez, 2002 UT App 211, 1 48, 52 P.3d 451. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401 outlines the factors a trial court must consider before 
determining whether to impose a consecutive sentence with the important caveat 
that " [ c] oncurrent sentences are favored over consecutive ones." Perez, 2002 UT 
App 211 at 1 43 ( citations omitted). 
Section 76-3-401 states in part the following: 
(2) In determining whether state offenses are to run concurrently or 
consecutively, the court shall consider the gravity and circumstances 
of the offenses, the number of victims, and the history, character, 
and rehabilitative needs of the defendant. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(2); see also Helms, 2002 UT 12 at ,I 9. The statute also 
states that the court "shall order that sentences for state offenses run consecutively 
if the later offense is committed while the defendant is imprisoned or on parole, 
unless the court finds and states on the record that consecutive sentencing would 
be inappropriate." Utah Code Ann.§ 76-3-401(3). 
Utah courts have found violations of these principles in a few cases. For 
example, in State v. Smith, 909 P.2d 236 (Utah 1995), the trial court's consecutive 
sentence failed to account for the defendant's rehabilitative needs. Id. at 244-45. 
Even though Smith was convicted of serious crimes (aggravated kidnapping, rape 
of a child, and sodomy on a child), and several factors weighed in favor of 
consecutive sentences (heinousness, pedophilia, and the defendant's lack of 
treatment), the court's failure to consider his rehabilitative needs required a new 
sentencing hearing. Id. at 238, 244-455. 
Similarly, in Gall~ the trial court abused its discretion because it failed to 
consider mitigating circumstances. Galli, 967 P.2d at 938. Galli was convicted of 
three counts of aggravated robbery, absconded, and lived in Minnesota for three 
years before being sentenced. See id. at 932. The supreme court held that the trial 
court abused its discretion when it ordered consecutive sentences because: (1) the 
trial court may not have "given adequate weight to certain mitigating 
circumstances," including the fact that the defendant "did not inflict any physical 
injuries," only used a "pellet gun," and took a relatively small" amount of money; 
(2) the defendant's history consisted only of "minor traffic offenses and one 
7 
misdemeanor theft conviction," and his act of absconding only provided "nominal 
support" since he was not charged with bail jumping; (3) although the defendant's 
"offenses and flight from justice reflected negatively on his character," he 
"voluntarily confessed and admitted responsibility," "expressed a commitment and 
hope t_o improve himself," and, while in Minnesota, "obeyed the law, helped his 
neighbors, and was a productive individual"; and (4) concurrent sentencing "better 
serve [ ed]" his "rehabilitative needs by allowing the Board of Pardons and Parole 
to release him from prison after five years if he has shown genuine progress toward 
rehabilitation." Id. at 938; see also State v. Strunk, 846 P.2d 1297, 1301-02 (Utah 
1993) (holding trial court abused discretion by sentencing 16-year-old convicted of 
murder, child kidnapping, aggravated sexual abuse of a child to consecutive 
sentences even though diagnostic report recommended "long period of 
imprisonment" because trial court's sentence assured defendant "would spend a 
minimum of twenty-four years in prison," failed to "sufficiently consider 
defendant's rehabilitative needs in light of his extreme youth and the absence of 
prior violent crimes," and "rob[bed] the Board of Pardons of any flexibility to 
parole [defendant] sooner"). 
In Perez, this court found that a trial court erred when it sentenced the 
defendant consecutively without any indication that it had considered any of the 
statutory factors other than the "gravity and circumstances of the offense." Id. at 1 
48. In Perez, the defendant had been convicted of aggravated burglary, a first-
degree felony and attempted murder, a second-degree felony. Id. at 1 20. On 
8 
,,J) 
appeal, he argued that the trial court abused its discretion by imposing consecutive 
prison terms without considering all of the required statutory factors. Id. at, 42. 
Perez's presentence report recommended that he serve concurrent prison terms 
and the prosecutor agreed with that recommendation. Id. at, 44. Even though the 
trial court found that Perez's conduct was "egregious" and admittedly touched on 
the "gravity and circumstances of the offense," its consecutive sentence was 
inappropriate. Id. at 45. This was because the court "did not explicitly address the 
presentence report's recommendation of concurrent sentences." Id at , 48. 
Because nothing in the record indicated that the trial court ""consider[ed] the ... 
history, character, and rehabilitative needs of the defendant in determining 
whether to impose consecutive sentences," the trial court erred. Id. (citation 
omitted). 
When a trial court does not make findings as to the basis for the imposition 
of consecutive sentences and the consideration as to relevant factors, appellate 
courts will uphold the trial court's imposition of consecutive sentences if it is 
reasonable to assume that the court considered all appropriate factors. Helms, 2002 
UT 12 at ,r 11; State v. Valdez, 2008 UT App 329, 194 P.3d 195. Appellate courts 
will not, however, assume that the trial court considered all required factors and 
made appropriate findings in circumstances where the record does not support 
such findings. Helms, 2002 UT 12 at ,r 11. 
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The record in this case does not demonstrate that the trial court adequately 
considered three issues: the relative significance of the crime, the punishment he 
had already received, as well as the realities of drug addiction. 
A. THE GRAVITY AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE OFFENSE WERE 
FAIRLY MINOR AND THERE WERE NO KNOWN VICTIMS. 
Utah has only recently criminalized the possession of spice, 1 but the 
literature supports the fact that we no little of its actual effects on humans. "Spice 
and its psychoactive constituents, synthetic cannabinoids, represent an increasingly 
1 It should be noted that the substance Mr. Sexton possessed, AB-CHMINACA, is 
not listed on the list of controlled substances in Utah. See Utah Code Ann.§ 58-37-
4.2. Mr. Sexton did not challenge this fact prior to his plea, nor did he make the 
very reasonable challenge that the substance is not a controlled substance analog 
as defined in the code because the literature indicates that there is "no information 
is available about in vitro or in vivo human metabolism of AB-CHMINACA." 
Claudio Erratico et al., In vitro and in vivo human metabolism of the synthetic cannabinoid 
AB-CHMINACA, 7 Drug Testing and Analysis 866-876 (2015). 
If challenged, the State would have to prove that AB-CHMINACA was 
substantially similar to a prohibited substance, something that appears to be 
unsupported at this time. See State v. Arghittu, 2015 UT App 22, 120, 343 P.3d 709 
("the State was required to provide reasonably believable evidence that [ a 
controlled substance analog's] chemical structure was 'substantially similar' to [a 
controlled substance's] chemical structure and that [the controlled substance 
analog] either had a substantially similar effect as (the controlled substance] or was 
'represented or intended' to have such an effect"). 
Mr. Sexton waived these challenges by virtue of his plea, nor does there appear to 
be a misplea or illegal sentence, since there would be at least a reasonable dispute 
about whether AB-CHMINACA is a controlled substance analog. Utah Code 
Ann. § 58-37-2. These matters may be properly resolved in a post-conviction 
proceeding. However, for purposes of this appeal, this court should use this 
information as evidence that AB-CHMINACA was a relatively minor controlled 
substance as it relates to the gravity of the offense for sentencing. See discussion 
infra. 
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popular trend in substance use for which researchers and clinicians have inszifficient 
data." 2 
There are no randomized controlled trials for Spice. Furthermore, 
few of the synthetic cannabinoids have been tested on humans 
(Auwarter et al. 2009). Most of the information on Spice is 
anecdotal-from internet forums, calls to emergency responders and 
Poison Control Centers, and case reports in the medical literature. 
To what extent the available literature accurately represents the 
phenomenon of Spice is unclear. 3 
Even the "prevalence of psychotic reactions is not clear [from Spice use] and 
surveys of Spice users have yielded inconsistent results. "4 
Clearly, the legislature has prohibited the product, and there are anecdotal 
indications of its hallucinogenic effects, but nonetheless, the possession of the 
substance was a relatively minor offense. It is classified as a Class A misdemeanor, 
not at the felony level like other major drugs. Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2). And 
while it may have addictive qualities, it has not been shown to have near the 
addictive qualities of other harmful drugs, like methamphetamine or heroin. 5 
Additionally, no one was victimized by the offense. Therefore, two of the factors 
the legislature has asked courts to consider do not support the imposition of 
consecutive sentences. 
2 Max Spadema et al., Spicing thing up: Synthetic cannabinoids, 228 
PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 525-540 (2013) 
3 Id. 
4 Id. 
5 Marisol S. Castaneto et al., Synthetic cannabinoids: Epidemiology, pharmacodynamics, and 
clinical implications, 144 DRUG AND ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE 12-41 (2014) 
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B. WHILE MR. SEXTON HAD A HISTORY OF NON-COMPLIANCE 
WITH PROBATION, THIS WAS DUE TO HIS STRUGGLES WITH 
DRUG ADDICTION, WHICH THE COURT ACKNOWLEDGED, BUT 
IT ERRED IN OVERLY PUNISHING HIM FOR THE OFFENSE. 
By the time Mr. Sexton was sentenced for possession of the spice, he had 
been arrested, violated on his parole, returned to prison and done four months in 
custody. R. 52:7-9. 11-12. The court gave him six months and he had already 
served two-thirds of that sentence. It was likely that he would do significantly more 
time in prison for what the legislature has deemed to be a relatively minor offense. 
Mr. Sexton clearly was heavily punished for having spice in his room and the 
court's imposition of additional jail or prison time for this offense (by imposing a 
consecutive sentence) improperly and overly relied on his lack of success at 
probation. His failures, however, are common with drug addicts. 
The trial court failed to properly account for Mr. Sexton's rehabilitative 
needs, even though it acknowledged that "addiction is tough," and was "a very 
difficult thing." R. 52:12. The sentence reflects that the court failed to appreciate 
that most offenders will relapse and will relapse on multiple occasions during their 
struggle with addiction. 
Drug addiction is a serious disease and there is an extremely high likelihood 
of relapse among addicts. "Not long ago, discussions about relapse were 
categorically avoided in addiction treatment programs [for] fear□ that discussing 
the possibility of relapse would only make it more likely to happen .... Now it is 
12 
openly acknowledged by addiction treatment professionals that relapses can and 
do happen. "6 
One national study showed that after five years of successfully completing 
rehabilitative treatment for drug dependency, only 21 percent actually reported 
reduced usage, meaning that 79 percent of treated offenders relapsed. 7 Of a group 
of 967,012 drug users completing treatment, the study found that only 155,689 
individuals were able to successfully avoid a relapse.8 "Following treatment for 
chemical dependency or substance abuse, individuals experience a high relapse 
rate. Relapse rates vary from one treatment program to another but these rates 
can be as high as 90 percent."9 According to another researcher, "[a]pproximately 
two-thirds of clients will use their drugs of choice within a year of leaving 
treatment." 10 The period soon after leaving treatment is the period "of highest risk, 
and it needs the greatest attention." 11 
6 ARNOLD M. WASHTON &JOANE. ZWEBEN, COCAINE & METHAMPHETAMINE 
ADDICTION: TREATMENT, RECOVERY, AND RELAPSE PREVENTION 153 0/'f. W. 
Norton & Company) (2009) 
7 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MENTAL HEALTH AND SUBSTANCE ABUSE 
AMONG ADOLESCENTS (Dept. of Health and Human Services, Substance Abuse 
and Mental Health Services Administration) (1999) ("Those using any illicit drug 
decreased from 75 percent before treatment to 59 percent after treatment") 
B Id. 
9 STEPHANIE L. BROOKE, THE USE OF THE CREATIVE THERAPIES WITH 
CHEMICAL DEPENDENCY ISSUES 139-40 (Charles C Thomas Publisher) (2009); 
William A. Hunt et al., Relapse rates in addiction programs, 27 JOURNAL OF CLINICAL 
PSYCHOLOGY 455-456 (1971); GRIFFITH EDWARDS & MALCOLM HAROLD 
LADER, ADDICTION: PROCESSES OF CHANGE (Oxford University Press) (1994) 
lo ROBERT R. PERKINSON, CHEMICAL DEPENDENCY COUNSELING: A 
PRACTICAL GUIDE 130 (SAGE) (2011) 
11 Id. at 130 
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Clearly, the court understood that addictive behavior was difficult. But 
rather than sentencing according to that understanding, the court made several 
erroneous observations. The court told Mr. Sexton that he had the obligation to 
find to overcome the addiction himself: "You've got to figure out some tools to be 
able to resist that and make better choices," and "you're the one that's got to make 
those choices when the chips are done, when it's tough," it said. R. 52: 12. While 
Mr. Sexton does bear some personal responsibility for drug use, the scientific 
community strongly recognizes that relapses and reoffending are merely part of 
dealing with addiction. 
The court's admonition that he must simply choose not to relapse is not 
supported by the literature, indeed by virtually any scholar in the medical 
community. As one scholar put it, it's not that people lack the choice to use, it's 
that the choice not to use causes them to seriously suffer. As he puts it, drug users 
begin to have "diminished voluntary control over the frequency and quantity of 
drugs taken, 'craving'-persistent, intrusive thoughts about drug use that 
complicate efforts to abstain." A drug user "can't choose from day to day not to 
have the habit and the cravings that help maintain it": 
Even in the absence of marked withdrawal symptoms, their cravings 
can make quitting very hard and relapse after quitting a continuing 
threat. 
Most people don't have such drug habits, no one wants to have such 
a drug habit, and the habit can't just be wished away. 
14 
And the problem-even in those cases when the attempt to abstain 
after a period of use leads to physical discomfort-is largely in the 
brain ... [I]f all problematic drug using careers consisted of a single 
spell of excessive use followed by withdrawal and abstinence 
thereafter, there wouldn't be enough of a drug problem to write 
books about. It's the persistent craving-which can lead to relapse 
even after years of abstinence-that makes addiction such a burden. 
[F]or someone with a persistent drug craving, the decision not to use 
requires effort, and induces suffering, in a way that most consumer 
decisions do not. Some chronic drug users are like persistent dieters 
who keep gaining back the weight they have lost: their long-term 
intention to get clean (or stay slim) loses out, again and again, to the 
immediate craving for the next dose or the next ice cream sundae. 12 
The idea that "drug abuse is a health problem and should be classified as a 
disease" is "widely accepted today among the medical establishment and most 
state and federal health agencies." 13 As some preeminent scientists observed, 
ordinary people, and unfortunately judges', wrong perceptions of a person's 
volition to use drugs has dangerous consequences: 
We have learned how some drugs and alcohol can disrupt volitional 
mechanisms by hijacking the brain mechanisms involved in seeking natural 
reinforcement and weakening brain mechanisms that inhibit these 
processes. This new knowledge has started to provide explanations of 
why the addicted person relapses even in the face of dire 
consequences such as loss of a child's custody or incarceration. 
However, despite these advances in understanding the neuroplastic 
changes to drugs and alcohol, addicted individuals continue to be 
stigmatized by the pernicious yet enduring popular belief that their ajjliction stems 
from voluntary behavior. The loss of behavioral control in the addicted 
individual should spur a renewed discussion of what constitutes 
12 JONATHAN P. CAULKINS ET AL., DRUG POLICY: WHAT EVERYONE NEEDS TO 
KNOW (Oxford University Press) (2015) 
13 STEVEN BELENKO & CASSIA SPOHN, DRUGS, CRIME, AND JUSTICE 47 (SAGE 
Publications) (2014) 
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volition, challenge us to identify the neurobiological substrates that 
go hayvvire, and influence our evolving strategies to direct our efforts 
to prevent and treat substance abuse and addiction more 
effectively. 14 
In a comprehensive literature review done by the American Medical 
Association, the scientists concluded after exammmg diagnoses, genetic 
heritability, the role of personal responsibility, pathophysiology, untreated persons, 
medication effectiveness, and medical treatment options that "[d]rug dependence 
should be insured, treated, and evaluated like other chronic illnesses" rather than 
as a personal choice. 15 Sadly, the trial court failed to treat Mr. Sexton's behavior as 
mere symptoms of his disease. 
The court also wrongfully decided that Mr. Sexton's sentence should 
involve sending a message to others not to use drugs while in treatment. The 
purpose of the sentence, it put, was "to send you a message that we've got to try 
and clean it up. It's got to start somewhere. And I'm not saying it's starting with 
you, but you're one of those that we're going to get relatively tough on if you're 
taking that into NUCCC." R. 52:12-13. 
Again, this comment reflects a serious misunderstanding of how addiction 
works. Users are going to relapse. Users will most likely reoffend. Notably, 
treatment for chronic drug users "may need to last a lifetime" since "drug 
14 Nora Volkow & Ting-Kai Li, The neuroscience of addiction, 8 NATURE 
NEUROSCIENCE 1429-1430 (2005) 
15 McLellan A et al., Drug dependence, a chronic medical illness: Implications for treatment, 
insurance, and outcomes evaluation, 284 JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN MEDICAL 
ASSOCIATION 1689-1695 (2000) 
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-~ 
addiction is a lifelong condition."16 Giving Mr. Sexton a consecutive sentence to 
get tough on others' (including his own) relapses while in treatment, fundamentally 
misunderstands the nature of addiction and only punishes a person, rather than 
giving him the tools he needs to succeed. 
CONCLUSION 
For these reasons, the trial court abused its discretion in imposing a 
consecutive sentence. It failed to account for the relatively minor nature of the 
offense, the amount of time in custody Mr. Sexton had already served and would 
continue to serve for that offense, and for the fact that relapses are common 
occurrences in the treatment of addiction. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this I y day of March, 2016. 
SAMifE~ P. NEWTON 
Attorno/for the Defendant/ Appellant 
16 BELENK.O & SPOHN at 48 
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UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
FIITH .AMENDMENT 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise 
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand 
Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the 
Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor 
shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in 
jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case 
to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be 
taken for public use, without just compensation. 
FOURTEENTH.AMENDMENT, SECTION 1 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to 
the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the 
State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law 
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the 
United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
UTAH CONSTITUTION 
ARTICLE I, SECTION 7. [DUE PROCESS OF LAW.] 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due 








76-3-401. Concurrent or consecutive sentences -- Lintltations --
Definition. 
(1) A court shall determine, if a defendant has been adjudged guilty of more than 
one felony offense, whether to impose concurrent or consecutive sentences for 
the offenses. The court shall state on the record and shall indicate in the order 
of judgment and commitment: 
(a) if the sentences imposed are to run concurrently or consecutively to each 
other; and 
(b) if the sentences before the court are to run concurrently or consecutively 
with any other sentences the defendant is already serving. 
(2) In determining whether state offenses are to run concurrently or consecutively, 
the court shall consider the gravity and circumstances of the offenses, the 
number of victims, and the history, character, and rehabilitative needs of the 
defendant. 
(3) The court shall order that sentences for state offenses run consecutively if the 
later offense is committed while the defendant is imprisoned or on parole, 
unless the court finds and states on the record that consecutive sentencing 
would be inappropriate. 
(4) If a written order of commitment does not clearly state whether the sentences 
are to run consecutively or concurrently, the Board of Pardons and Parole shall 
request clarification from the court. Upon receipt of the request, the court shall 
enter a clarified order of commitment stating whether the sentences are to run 
consecutively or concurrently. 
(5) A court may impose consecutive sentences for offenses arising out of a single 
criminal episode as defined in Section 76-1-401. 
(6) (a) If a court imposes consecutive sentences, the aggregate maximum of all 
sentences imposed may not exceed 30 years imprisonment, except as 
provided under Subsection (6)(b). 
(b) The limitation under Subsection (6)(a) does not apply if: 
(i) an offense for which the defendant is sentenced authorizes the death 
penalty or a maximum sentence of life imprisonment; or 
(ii) the defendant is convicted of an additional offense based on conduct 
which occurs after his initial sentence or sentences are imposed. 
(7) The limitation in Subsection (6)(a) applies if a defendant: 
(a) is sentenced at the same time for more than one offense; 
(b) is sentenced at different times for one or more offenses, all of which were 
committed prior to imposition of the defendant's initial sentence; or 
(c) has already been sentenced by a court of this state other than the present 
sentencing court or by a court of another state or federal jurisdiction, and 
the conduct giving rise to the present offense did not occur after his initial 
sentencing by any other court. 
(8) When the limitation of Subsection (6)(a) applies, determining the effect of 
consecutive sentences and the manner in which they shall be served, the Board 
of Pardons and Parole shall treat the defendant as though he has been 
committed for a single term that consists of the aggregate of the validly imposed 
prison terms as follows: 
(a) if the aggregate maximum term exceeds the 30-year limitation, the 
maximum sentence is considered to be 30 years; and 
(b) when indeterminate sentences run consecutively, the minimum term, if any, 
constitutes the aggregate of the validly imposed minimum terms. 
(9) When a sentence is imposed or sentences are imposed to run concurrently with 
the other or with a sentence presently being served, the term that provides the 
longer remaining imprisonment constitutes the time to be served. 
(10) This section may not be construed to restrict the number or length of 
individual consecutive sentences that may be imposed or to affect the validity 
of any sentence so imposed, but only to limit the length of sentences actually 
served under the commitments. 
(11) This section may not be construed to limit the authority of a court to impose 
consecutive sentences in misdemeanor cases. 
(12) As used in this section, "imprisoned" means sentenced and committed to a 
secure correctional facility as defined in Section 64-13-1, the sentence has not 
been terminated or voided, and the person is not on parole, regardless of 
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P R O C E E D I N G S 
MR. SAUNDERS: No. 41, Nathan Sexton. 
THE COURT: State of Utah versus Nathan Sexton. Case 
No. 151902086. Time set for preliminary hearing. 
MR. MARSHALL: Your Honor, this is my understanding. 
We won't need a preliminary hearing. The State is moving to 
amend Count 1 to a Class B misdemeanor and Mr. Sexton will then 
plead to the amended Count 1 and Count 2, two Class B 
misdemeanors. 
THE COURT: Mr. Sexton, it's been reported to the 
Court that you are willing to waive your preliminary hearing 
and enter a plea to an amended Count 1, possession or use of a 
controlled substance within a correctional facility, Class B 
misdemeanor. Is that an attempt or anything like that? 
MR. MARSHALL: (Inaudible) attempt or strike the jail 
language, one or the other. 
MR. SAUNDERS: We'll strike the jail language, your 
Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. We'll strike the jail language on 
that one so it will just be a simple use or possession of a 
controlled substance, Class B misdemeanor, on Count 1. Use or 
possession of drug paraphernalia, Class B, on Count 2. 
Is that your understanding? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
THE COURT: All right. Are you under the influence 



























of any prescribed medication or any other substance that would 
impair your ability to waive your preliminary hearing and enter 
a plea to the charges? 
THE DEFENDANT: No. 
THE COURT: Do you suffer any physical or mental 
disability that would interfere with understanding what's going 
on today? 
THE DEFENDANT: No. 
THE COURT: At a preliminary hearing the State has a 
burden to show probable cause that the crimes alleged against 
you were committed and that they were committed by you. Are 
you willing to waive that probable cause burden? Actually with 
it being Class B does there even need to be a waiver with the 
amendment? 
MR. SAUNDERS: Not on a prelim, no, your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. Is there a written plea 
agreement? All right. Mr. Sexton, you've represented to the 
Court that you understand the charges against you. What I'm 
going to do right now -- you're waiving a bunch of rights in 
changing your plea, rights that are attendant to a trial like 
cross-examining witnesses, calling witnesses on your own 
behalf, presumption of innocence and a jury trial. 
And you understand that you're waiving all of those 
rights? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I do. 



























THE COURT: All right. Mr. Saunders is going to read 
a factual basis for the plea. Within that factual basis are 
all the elements of the offense that the State would have to 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt. And I'll talk to you about 
that in just a moment. 
MR. SAUNDERS: Your Honor, on May 29th he was an 
inmate at NUCCC. He had in his possession basically spice, a 
controlled substance while within that facility. That would be 
the factual basis, your Honor. 
MR. MARSHALL: It was found in a desk in his room. 
THE COURT: Constructive possession then? 
MR. SAUNDERS: Yes, your Honor. He also had the 
paraphernalia would be the bag that the spice was located in. 
MR. MARSHALL: (Inaudible). 
Counsel is not speaking into the microphone and the 
transcriber cannot hear him. 
MR. SAUNDERS: I believe there was another -- did he 
not admit, Mr. Marshall? 
MR. MARSHALL: (Inaudible). There was --
MR. SAUNDERS: He admitted to possessing. 
MR. MARSHALL: And there were matches and 
THE DEFENDANT: No, I had a lighter, not matches. 
MR. MARSHALL: Excuse me. Lighter and some papers, 
(inaudible) papers. 
MR. SAUNDERS: That's sufficient. 



























THE COURT: Thank you. Mr. Sexton, do you understand 
that entering these pleas you are admitting to each of the 
elements of both of those offenses? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, your Honor. 
THE COURT: The Class B misdemeanor carrying anywhere 
from zero to 180 days in jail, anywhere from zero to a thousand 
dollars in fines. Do you understand the minimum and maximum 
penalties that could be imposed at sentencing? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I do. 
THE COURT: I'm assuming that we're going forward 
with sentencing today. Is that correct? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
THE COURT: If that happens then, what you've got is 
a -- normally you'd have no less than two, no more than 45 days 
to be sentenced. If we go forward with sentencing today, 
you're not going to have an opportunity to think about these 
pleas and then do a motion to withdraw before sentencing 
because that's the key thing. You've got to do it before 
sentencing. If we go forward with sentencing today, it would 
be a post-conviction relief that you'd have to go after rather 
than a motion to withdraw your plea. 
Do you understand that? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I do. 
THE COURT: There's more than one offense here. It 
is possible that the Court could impose a consecutive sentence. 


























I normally don't do that. I normally go concurrent, but you 
need to understand that it is a possibility. 
You understand that? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I do. 
7 
THE COURT: All right. Are you under the influence 
of any coercion or duress that would make you feel like these 
pleas are not absolutely voluntarily on your part? 
THE DEFENDANT: No. 
THE COURT: To Count 1, use or possession of a 
controlled substance, Class B misdemeanor, how do you plead? 
THE DEFENDANT: Guilty. 
THE COURT: Sorry? 
THE DEFENDANT: Guilty. 
THE COURT: Thank you. To Count 2, use or possession 
of drug paraphernalia, how do you plead? 
THE DEFENDANT: Guilty. 
THE COURT: Court will accept those pleas as knowing 
and voluntarily. I informed you that you had the right to wait 
at least two and no more than 45 days for sentencing. Do you 
wish to waive that two day time period and go forward today? 
THE DEFENDANT: Sure. Yes, your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. Mr. Marshall, go ahead. 
MR. MARSHALL: It kind of is what it is at this 
point, but he is at the prison and I want the Court to know 
why. He was on parole. And because of this, what he's just 



























pled to, that was also considered a parole violation so the 
time that he's doing right now is on the parole violation which 
is essentially the same thing that are these charges. And so 
we're asking the Court to of course run the two concurrently 
with each other, but we'd ask the Court to run the sentence 
concurrent with the time he's doing in prison right now on the 
parole violation because it's really all the same offense. 
So we're asking the Court to run that all 
concurrently and allow that time to be served at the prison. 
THE COURT: Mr. Saunders. 
MR. SAUNDERS: Was the agreement with (inaudible) to 
recommend concurrent? 
MR. MARSHALL: No. 
MR. SAUNDERS: Your Honor, we'd ask the Court then to 
run them consecutively. He's on parole. The presumption under 
the statute for an offense committed while on parole is that 
they run consecutively. 
THE DEFENDANT: But I was on probation and got 
paroled (inaudible.) 
(The defendant is not speaking into a microphone and 
the transcriber could not hear him.) 
MR. SAUNDERS: I don't think so. He wouldn't have 
been violated and taken back to prison on a probation 
violation. 
THE DEFENDANT: I never indicated (inaudible.) 


























MR. SAUNDERS: That doesn't make any sense to me. 
THE DEFENDANT: Well, I was a county inmate. 
THE COURT: Well, it is going to be what it is. 
9 
MR. SAUNDERS: So, your Honor, based on the fact that 
he is in NUCCC, I am asking the Court to run those 
consecutively and the fact that he was on parole. 
THE COURT: Mr. Sexton, I'd like to hear from you. 
Go ahead. 
THE DEFENDANT: I was actually on a charge -- they 
didn't send me to prison. They put me on probation to go to 
NUCCC and then I violated more than once. And then that's why 
they decided to drop my probation, and that's what sent me to 
prison. I hadn't been to prison yet by that time. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: That's right. He is on 
probation right now. 
MR. MARSHALL: So that is unusual. 
MR. SAUNDERS: I would still say based on fact --
this is NUCCC. The Court hears all the time about the problem 
we have in NUCCC with drugs. And I think it's appropriate to 
send a message that we're going to run those consecutive when 
somebody possesses a controlled substance while in NUCCC. 
THE COURT: All right. Anything further, Mr. Sexton? 
We kind of --
THE DEFENDANT: Yeah, because this is what -- I've 



























already done almost four months because of this. I mean I 
would just say please run it concurrent. I mean I'm trying to 
get my life, you know, over, I mean, started again, you know, 
and already charges enough. I've already been -- this is back 
from December 2013 is my original charges and I've been going 
through all this for quite a while now and I would just ask 
for, you know, let it go with this because I don't want to go 
to prison and then just go right back to jail after that. I 
mean I need to get out and get a job and progress my life. 
THE COURT: What does happen as far as where this 
time is served? If it's consecutive, when he's done with his 
parole or his prison time, do they then release him to serve 
time at Weber County? 
MR. SAUNDERS: He has the option of serving out at 
the prison or not, your Honor. 
MR. MARSHALL: The Court can authorize that to be 
served at the prison. 
Court can authorize. 
It's not the Court's decision, but the 
THE DEFENDANT: (Inaudible). 
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Your Honor, I would like to 
just say something really fast. This is his fourth attempt at 
programming at trying to complete NUCCC. He's struggled 
(inaudible) all four times and it's really frustrating because 
we get a lot of people standing up here saying they don't want 
to go back to NUCCC because people are bringing drugs in and it 



























really does not help with other people who are trying to be 
successful and complete their probation. I just wanted you to 
know that his agent did say that all four times he's struggled 
with this. 
THE COURT: All right. The Court will impose the 
following sentence. On Count 1, use or possession of 
controlled substance, Class B misdemeanor, 180 days in the 
Weber County Jail and on Count 2, use or possession of drug 
paraphernalia, Class B misdemeanor, 180 days in the Weber 
County Jail. I am going to order that those be served 
concurrent with each other but consecutive to your prison 
sentence. 
THE DEFENDANT: Then what about the four months I've 
already served pretty much because of this charge? 
THE COURT: Well, I don't know that there's credit 
for time served because you were already in violation of some 
other sentencing order and I can't give you credit for time 
that you've served in violation of some other sentencing order 
which is really what you're doing. 
THE DEFENDANT: I mean they had three months to file 
this before, I mean, I even got -- and they didn't file until 
four months later, I mean, so I pretty much went to jail 
because of this charge. 
MR. MARSHALL: Would Court allow that to be served at 
the prison? 



























THE COURT: Yes, I can allow that. I won't order, 
but I will allow that, yes. 
Mr. Sexton, there's some frustration, I think, among 
AP&P and a lot of the people working with you that you've had a 
lot of opportunities given to you. We understand addiction is 
tough. It's a very difficult thing. 
THE DEFENDANT: (Inaudible). I mean everybody has it 
there, you know, and this time it actually wasn't even mine, 
but it was in my room, but I'm pleading because Class A was 
worse than a Class B but. 
THE COURT: You got to make some wise choices when 
you're out on the street. Most people when they are standing 
where you're standing, they really are determined to stay 
clean, and I'm sure you're feeling the same. And it's tough 
when people have it all around you. You've got to figure out 
some tools to be able to resist that and make better choices. 
I think everybody wants to see you be successful, but 
you're the one that's got to make those choices when the chips 
are done, when it's tough. I've given you kind of a 
middle-of-the-road sentence instead of going as harsh as the 
State wants. I haven't gone quite that harsh, but I haven't 
been as lenient either as Mr. Marshall or you would like me to 
be, but it is to send you a message that we've got to try and 
clean it up. It's got to start somewhere. And I'm not saying 
it's starting with you, but you're one of those that we're 


























going to get relatively tough on if you're taking that into 
NUCCC. 
13 
I do wish the best to you, Mr. Sexton. I hope things 
work out for you as quickly as possible. I hope you can get 
your feet back on the road you want to be on. All right. 
Thank you. 
(PROCEEDINGS IN THE ABOVE-ENTITLED 
MATTER WERE CONCLUDED.) 
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